Kunce, Mitch (2022) Constant Returns to Scale with Pollution Modeled as an Unpaid Factor. British Journal of Environmental Sciences, 10 (3). pp. 40-51. ISSN 2054-6351 (print), 2054-636X
Constant Returns to Scale with Pollution Modeled.pdf - Published Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.
Download (387kB)
Abstract
If pollution emissions enter a constant returns to scale production function, the additional output generated by this unpaid factor cannot be an equilibrium phenomenon. Private factors will engage in rent seeking without some form of rationing. Herein, we propose a shared rationing mechanism and investigate the efficiency implications in a setting of devolved decision making. General equilibrium derived optimal conditions show that taxing capital alone will not provide the revenue for efficient local public good levels. Suboptimal public goods provision then leads to inefficient environmental quality. Interestingly, larger shares of emission rents rationed to mobile capital result in environmental competition becoming more fierce. Conversely, when large shares of rent are captured by locally owned fixed-factors, competition for mobile capital is subdued.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Uncontrolled Keywords: | environmental federalism, rent dissipation, capital tax competition |
Subjects: | G Geography. Anthropology. Recreation > GE Environmental Sciences |
Depositing User: | Professor Mark T. Owen |
Date Deposited: | 29 Apr 2022 19:37 |
Last Modified: | 29 Apr 2022 19:37 |
URI: | https://tudr.org/id/eprint/434 |