THE DIFFUSION OF THE WESTERN MODEL OF DEMOCRACY TO SUB-SAHARAN (FRENCH-SPEAKING) RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE THEORETICAL PARTITIONS BETWEEN ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Dr Assana
Lecturer-researcher, Senior Lecturer at the University of Ngaoundéré (Cameroon)
Department of Political Science

ABSTRACT: *This article analyses the types of relationship that sub-Saharan religious organizations have with the Western model of democracy. Indeed, the end of the Cold War has been presented as translating in international relations the global consensus around liberal democracy. However, the worldwide diffusion of liberal democracy has produced contrasting effects in so-called religious organizations. While in church organizations with a Judeo-Christian tradition, democratic mimicry predominates under the benefit of original processes of local reinterpretation, on the contrary, it has prompted a reaction of protest against the unique model of democracy in Islamic organizations. By subscribing to the theories of transnationalism and interdependence, the objective of this article is to demonstrate that there is a homology of rationalities between states and religious organizations in relation to the Western model of democracy. This homology of rationalities reveals that the international circulation of democratic values does not adapt to the theoretical divisions established between the actors of international relations.*

KEYWORDS: democratization, democracy, international relations, mimicry, westernization of the world in question, religious organizations, states, sub-Saharan Africa

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War has been presented as translating the global consensus around democracy into international relations (See Fukuyama, 1962; (Huntington, 1997; Mandelbaum, 2005; Mc Faul, 2005; Sindjoun, 2001). To begin a number of important observations are to be noted. These observations are: the bankruptcy of the Soviet system, the gradual conversion of the Chinese model to a form of `` market socialism '' and the massive collapse of dictatorial regimes around the world (Fukuyama , 1962) .This thesis also finds strong arguments in statistics[1]on the one hand and paradigmatic changes, through the shift from interest in the state

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[1]The world is more democratic than ever. As shown in the report entitled : the State of Democracy in the World in 2019, more than half of the world's countries (97 countries, or 62%) are now democratic (compared to only 26% in 1975) and more than half of the world (97 countries, or 62%) are now democratic half (57%) of the world's population, or more than four billion people, now live in some form of democracy, up from 36% in 1975). The share of non-democratic regimes have more than halved since 1975 (68% of countries in 1975 against only 20% in 2018 (The State of Democracy in the World in 2019: 4). Multiplication and proliferation which then testify at a given moment to what is considered legitimate (Sindjoun, 2001)

in early Africanism to the enchanted attachment to democracy at the beginning of the 1990s[2] on the other hand.

On the theoretical level, the worldwide diffusion of democracy renews the debate on the dynamics of import / export of "modern Western political technologies" (Darbon, 1993: 114) in particular, in non-Western societies of Africa, of Asia and Latin America. However, in the science of international relations, democracy is approached in the context of its relationship to peace (Vennesson, 1998: 515-534; Russet, 1993; Martineau, Dufour, 2008: pp. 308-414). On the one hand, liberal analyses insist on a causal link between national democratic forms of government, international peace and security (Jack, 1989: pp. 79-99; Sindjoun, 2001: 31-50; Russet, 1993; Mc Faul, 2004, pp. 147-163); on the other hand, the neorealists who formulate the theory of democratic peace (TDP)[3], by asserting that Democratic Peace Theory (TDP) is symmetrically hawkish. This theory evokes the case of "belligerent democratizations" and the desire to eradicate undemocratic regimes (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Mearsheimer, 1980; Mann, 2001; Henderson, Errol, 2002).

The scientific interest in the worldwide dissemination of the Western model of democracy in sub-Saharan religious organizations is linked to research on democracy and democratization. Focusing on a split conception of international relations implying a confrontation between idealism and realism, many studies favoured the stato-centered framework[4]. However, since non-state actors are neglected in favour of state actors, it is difficult to grasp the areas of concubinage between the "stato-centric world" and the "multi-centric world" (Badie and smouts, 1992; Rosenau, 1990) in the international circulation of democratic values. The objective of this article is to analyse the types of relationship that sub-Saharan (francophone) religious organisations have with the Western model of democracy[5]. Despite a commonly held view that relegates the religion to the rank of retrograde forces, in Africa religious ideas and actors have always been vectors of socio-political change[6] (Weber, 2000; Mouiche, 2007; Ter

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[2] "Inversely proportional to the political" downgrading "of which the State is the object, the overbidding of democracy entails a total transfer, in favor of this political scheme, of all the mythologies hitherto shared around the State as an axis repository and actantial instance of the projection and realization of the collective destiny. In the same way in which the State is, in the configuration of the passage from the colony to the postcolony, the bearer of all the aspirations and hopes aggregated around a symbolically constructed `` independence '', a historical break, democracy obtains from 'to be erected to the status of an organizing category of the legitimate "meaning" and "power" (Balandier, 1971) of a transition also projected in terms of caesura" (cited by Onana, 2016: 20-21).

[3] Democratic peace theory (DPT) is known as the "dyadic" theory of democratic peace since it involves a dyad (two states) (Henderson, Errol, 2002).

[4] Since the mid-eighties, a debate has arisen within European studies on the need to go beyond satato-centrism in favor of the analysis of a polycentric political space, read on this question, Marie Claude-Smouts (dir), *op.cit*, p.113.

[5] 5 Sub-Saharan Africa refers to Black Africa as opposed to Northern or Mediterranean Africa and Arab Africa (Sindjoun, 2001).

[6] The study of the links between religions and democracy is part of a broader reflection on the relations between culture and politics. On these culturalist approaches to democracy, attention is paid to religion, presented as a potential obstacle, but often seen as real, to democratization. In this perspective, certain religions are understood as, carriers of anti-democratic seeds, and designated as being in themselves incompatible with the emergence of a civic culture: from Catholicism to Islam, including Orthodoxy or Confucianism, all or almost all, with the

Haar and Ellis, 2006 cited by Mayke and Maud, 2011).Moreover, the inclusion of religious flows in globalisation is a fact that no serious analyst would dream of denying (Otayek, 2003: 51). Whether we emphasize the "globalization of religions" (Thual, 2003: 189-205), the growing transnationalization of religious networks (Badie, 1999: 23-58) or, more specifically, the passage of Islam to the West (Roy, 2002), what we can see from now on is an international game subverted by private actors, especially religious ones, whose proliferation consecrates the radical break with the Westphalian model founded on the primacy of state sovereignty (Otayek, 2003: 51).

By way of preliminary considerations, we should sacrifice the good old precept of Emile Durkheim that we should first define the words we use (Durkheim, 1987), since the intelligibilityof things can only be ensured in addition to the stabilization of the language achieved. To this end, we will first define the concepts of democracy and religious organizations, the key concepts around which our analyses are organized.

Any debate on democracy implies a prio clarification[7]. Democracy is understood here as a political regime, a mode of government, a political system, to be applied according to modalities reflecting the diversity of experiences and cultural particularities (Goujon, 2015: 11; Bassiouni et al, 1998: iv; Diamond and al, 1990: 9).

The term "religious organization" covers a wide variety of institutions. It applies just asmuch to institutionalized and hierarchical churches, referred to here as institutional churches, or to sects considered as a whole, as it does to non-ecclesiastical associations formed initially on the basis of religious affinity and endowed with more or less loose structures (Hermet, 1973:441-442). In the context of this study, the field of study is limited to Catholic, Protestant and Islamic organisations. However, the imperatives of analysis may lead us to refer to other examples of religious organizations.

The origins of democracy in its contemporary form, and of related constitutionalism, such as that of the nation-state, lie outside Africa. It first settled in Europe [8] and North America from the 18th century onwards, hence the frequent designation of Western democracy, often associated with, and sometimes confused with, liberal democracy (Goujoun, 2015: 8; Reno, 2018: 2), before being spread around the world in successive waves but in a non-linear manner through several vectors [9]. However, it is the third wave of democratization that has reached Africa and hence Francophone sub-Saharan religious organizations. Colonisation is probably

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exception of Protestantism, have been cited in the literature, although several specialists have denied this postulate (Seymour, 1963; Bayart, 2019).

[7]The problems inherent in the unequivocal definitions of a polysemous concept as "democracy" have been carefully analyzed by Jean-Leca and many precautions to be taken in dealing with the question of democracy in the Arab and Muslim world have been set out by Ghassan Salamé in his introduction to Democracies without Democrats (cited by Nouchine Yavari D'Hellencourt, 2005).

[8] It took root in Europe after the English and French revolutions.

[9] The types of democratic diffusion mechanisms have been drawn up, the authors distinguish the logics of diffusion, by foreign imposition or intervention, from those, more endogenous, by imitation or democratic contagion. Read usefully Santiso Javier, 1998: 228; Shipan and Volden, 2008: 840-857).

one of the strong points of this export process. Nevertheless, it has come back in force since the 1990s (Quantin, 2009: 67). The diffusion of democracy in (Francophone) religious organizations thus appears to be an important phenomenon to analyse. This study poses the problem of the reception of liberal democracy by sub-Saharan (francophone) religious organisations.

The central question then is: What kinds of relationships do sub-Saharan (francophone) religious organizations have with the Western model of democracy? To answer this question, we hypothesize that sub-Saharan (francophone) religious organizations have a relationship with liberal democracy that is identical to that of francophone post-colonial states. This homology of rationality between postcolonial French-speaking African states and sub-Saharan religious organizations in their relationship with democracy reveals the fragility of the theoretical partitions between state and non-state actors [10]. Our approach is nourished by transnationalism, notably Bertrand Badie, Marie Claude Smouts and K. Kaiser (1969) and the complex interdependence of R. Keohane (2001). Transnationalism makes it possible to grasp the modalities of the circulation of democratic values in French-speaking sub-Saharan religious organizations. Interdependence, on the other hand, makes it possible to analyse the habitus shared between states and sub-Saharan religious organisations in their relationship zith democracy.

In order to verify this hypothesis, data was collected through documentary analysis of articles, journals, books and specialized reports on the state of democracy in the world. It is also based on the study of constitutions, basic texts (the Bible and the Koran) of religious organizations. The discussion of the data collected gave rise to two orders of concern: the global diffusion of liberal democracy in sub-Saharan (Francophone) religious organizations (I) on the one hand, and the hybridization of the political system of Francophone sub-Saharan religious organizations (II) on the other hand, in sub-Saharan Africa.

The global spread of liberal democracy in French-speaking sub-Saharan religious organizations

In the contemporary postcolonial context, the diffusion of democracy refers to: "a process of importing a Euro-North American political model which materializes through the grafting and cutting of institutions, revealing a more or less deep implantation of democratic culture" (Reno, 2018: 2). Indeed, the diffusion of democracy involves two categories of actors having `` idealized '' images of themselves and their institutional systems, on the one hand, the importing companies (the dominated peripheries) of the political model, and on the other hand, the exporting companies (the dominant centre) of the political model (Darbon, 1993). This transfer results in the establishment of politico-institutional instruments in the new states (Reno, 2018: 2). Indeed, the experiences of import / export of institutional technologies are present in all political systems and at all known eras. In newly decolonized countries, democracy is a long journey that begins under colonization. The export of metropolitan institutions participates in the transfer of the democratic model (Reno, 2018: 2). In this perspective, the international

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[10] The hypothesis of the homology of rationalities between states and sub-Saharan religious organizations in relation to liberal democracy is inspired by the theory of structural homology of fields (Bourdieu, 1982).

influence of the Western model of democracy participates in the manifestation of world time (Zaki, 2001: 72). Moreover, the "technoscape" (the diffusion of technology) and the "mediascape" (flow of images) (Zaiki, 1997) allow sub-Saharan religious organizations to escape the trap of political territorialization. However, the global spread of democracy has had mixed fortunes, resulting in the grafting of the Western model of democracy into church organizations (A) and its rejection in Islamic organizations (B).

The grafting of democracy in ecclesial organizations

The grafting of democracy in French-speaking sub-Saharan religious organisations, thatis to say the adoption of democracy as a rule of organisation and functioning of the political life of the said religious organisations, is part of the dissolution of the internal/external distinction, as it is an analysis of international relations based on external influences affecting the nature of internal political regimes (Sindjoun, 2001:). In addition to the affinities between Christianity and democracy[11], the grafting of liberal democracy in ecclesial organisations can be analysed as an effect of interdependence, given that, "globalisation undoubtedly favours thedevelopment of a world democracy as a procedure: free elections and political alternation havebecome the political model of reference" (Laidi, 2001: 603). In fact, democracy should also berecognised as an international principle applicable to sub-Saharan religious organisations. In this vein, the Evangelical Church of Congo Brazzaville offers a remarkable example ofconvergences with dominant political models [12]. Similarly, while the Catholic Church was the declared enemy of the philosophy of human rights in the nineteenth century, since John XXIIIand the Vatican II Council, it has become its ally to the extent that Human Rights and democracy are now the new "political theology" through which the Catholic Church is exercising its universal moral magisterium afresh (Bourdin,2018). In this way, the Western model of democracy is spreading within the ecclesial organizations due to the necessity of adaptation to the international system. It is interesting to note that the grafting of the Western model ofdemocracy is taking place through the generalization of the consecration of procedural democracy (1) and its revitalization through the use of participatory democracy (2).

The generalization of the consecration of procedural democracy

In religious organizations, the grafting of liberal democracy results in political and constitutional changes. Procedural democracy as a political regime has taken root in the aforementioned ecclesial organizations, by articulating the election and the limitation of the elective mandate.

The regular organization of free elections, based on universal suffrage is an important criterion most often put forward in international relations, to assess the democratic nature of a political

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[11] Western Christianity has projected itself as a powerful organization, taking the form, without premeditated design, of secular states (Ellul, 2008).

[12] According to article 20: "The Evangelical Church of Congo responds to its prophetic vocation by its contribution to the emergence and consolidation of Democracy, the Rule of Law as well as by its fight for the Defense of Human Rights. Man, and fundamental freedoms, as long as these concepts are not in conformity with the Holy Scriptures", read the Fundamental Texts of the Evangelical Church of Congo: Extraordinary Synod January 2011, p.14.

regime (UNDP, 2005 cited by Pourtois, 2016: 411). In this regard, the reference to electoral democracy is very explicit in almost all of the basic texts of ecclesial organizations (Protestant and incidentally Catholic). This is particularly the case of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Cameroon (ELCC). According to article 26 of the 2007 constitution of this Church, the national bishop and the regional bishops are elected; the various councils at both national and grassroots level (regional councils, district councils, parish councils, councils of elders in congregations) are also set up by election". In the same sense, the constitution of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the Central African Republic (ELCCAR) of 2017 provides that: "the General Synod elects the President, the Vice-President, the Treasurers and the seven members of the board of directors as well as three (03) lay auditors". Similar provisions are found in the constitution of the Lutheran Fraternal Church in Chad (LFCC) in article 88 and in the Evangelical Church of the Congo in article 36. By consecrating election as a method of appointing leaders, the Church organizations opt for democracy as a procedure (Russet, 1993). Constitutional reforms allow church organizations to familiarize themselves with the rules of parliamentarism. the constitution of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the Central African Republic (ELCCAR) of 2017 provides that: "the General Synod elects the President, the Vice-President, the Treasurers and the seven members of the board of directors as well as three (03) lay people auditors". Similar provisions are found in the constitution of the Lutheran Fraternal Church in Chad (LFCC) in article 88 and in the Evangelical Church of the Congo in article 36. As in most states, "democratization is a means of international legitimization of political regimes" (Sindjoun, 1999: 25) in church organizations.

The question of the justification of election as a method of appointing rulers is obviously at the heart of the political thought of the promoters of representative government (Manin, 1995; Rosanvallon, 1998). The election of rulers is often seen as the sole guarantor of this consent. By electing the religious leaders (the clergy), the faithful or the citizens authorize, empower them to take, on their behalf, binding decisions to which the faithful voters should comply. In other words, the will of the people is the foundation of political authority; this will must be expressed through honest decisions which must take place periodically, by equal universal suffrage and secret ballot or following an equivalent procedure ensuring freedom of vote[13]. In retrospect, election was practiced in contexts and for reasons foreign to democracy (Olivier, 2014): for the designation of Abbots or Bishops, that of Rectors or professors in medieval and early modern universities, etc. The fact that for many it is "God" who manifests himself by actually choosing the winner does not necessarily lead to a passive attitude on the part of believers. It is important to vote, since "the Lord" proceeds through men: his choice is expressed through the votes of the citizens (Mayrargue, 2004, pp.159-173). However, democracy does not only imply the holding of free and fair elections, but also the setting up of a jurisdictional order allowing the control of votedlaws. This is evidenced by the creation of the Electoral

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[13]European democracies are marked by the widespread establishment of the elective mandate. In most cases, the constitutions of Council of Europe member states and of countries which are not members of the organisation contain provisions limiting the length of the term of office of the Head of State and giving him or her the right to be re-elected only once, read the *Report on democracy, term limits and incompatibility of political offices, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 93rd plenary session (Venice, 14-15 December 2012)*, Strasbourg, 31 January 2013, Study No. 646/2011, p.10

Commission and the Constitution and Convention Committee (CCC) in the ELCC. The central purpose of these institutions is to ensure that the clergy respects the texts, the supremacy of the constitution and the liberal principles it contains. As such, 'it has the power to annul acts taken in violation of the constitutional and regulatory provisions by any organ of the ELCC' (*Constitution and internal regulations of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Cameroon*: 18). Like states, church organizations rely on constitutionalism namely: 'the primacy of the constitution which imposesrules and constraints on religious authorities' (Goujon, 2015). The consecration of electoral democracy has as a corollary the limitation of the elective mandate.

The French-speaking sub-Saharan ecclesial organisations have also consecrated the limitation of the elective mandate. Within the framework of the inter-state system, what constitutes or is imposed as a model of organisation is susceptible to diffusion, imitation or imposition (Sindjoun, 2001: 36); such is the case with the limitation of the elective mandate. Most constitutions, internal regulations and basic texts of sub-Saharan ecclesial organisations include provisions limiting the duration of the clergy's mandate and giving them the right to bere-elected only once[13]. This is the case for the Churches of Cameroon (the ELCC in its article 26 (2);*the Presbyterian Church of Cameroon* (CPC) in its article 45), Mali (in its article 12), Congo (in its article 71), Chad (in its article 20), Gabon in its article 95, etc. These provisions stipulate that a person who is elected President or Bishop for two consecutive terms cannot be a candidate for the Presidency in the following elections. Term limits are usually placed in the context of a 'rotation system' or the principle of 'rotational office' (Ansolabehere, et *al*, 2007: 660-668; Loada, 2003: 145). In addition to the articulation of the election of representatives of the people at regular intervals and the limitation of the elective mandate, there is also a dynamic of revitalising procedural democracy through the use of participatory democracy in ecclesial organisations.

The revitalization of procedural democracy through the use of participatory democracy
The participatory ideal is an essential dimension of contemporary democracies which opens up the possibility of the emergence of a new figure of citizenship.[14] Indeed, the increasingly noticeable gap between the rulers, who are to represent the nation, and the citizens, who feel kept apart from the conduct of world affairs, testifies to the crisis of representative democracy (Dahl, 1994: 23-28 cited by Montes, 2001: 773). The importance assumed, in a few years, by participatory democracy is one of its strong symptoms. Moreover, as early as 1990, James Rosenau justified the multiplication of spontaneous collective actions by "increasingly centralization of political power" (Rosenau, 1990: 378). Along with States which are experiencing an upsurge in social movements, ecclesial organizations are won over by participatory democracy. Benin, the first country to organize the National Conference of the Living Forces experienced serious socio-political crises in 1989. These crises motivated the

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[14]Alexandra Goujon defines participatory democracy as: "a means of enriching representative democracy by offering increased participation of citizens outside electoral periods and through mechanisms for deliberation and consultation. Allowing a limited number of citizens to enlighten the decision of elected officials on circumscribed subjects, it differs from direct democracy which is defined by the participation of the whole of the people within the framework of referendum procedures "(Goujon, 2015: 39). Participatory democracy makes it possible to explore the new dimensions of political participation which are called "participatory democracy", "public debate", "citizen approaches" and aim to ensure a better presence of citizens in the circuits of public decision-making (Duran , Truong, 2013/3: 4-7 cited by Assana, 2020).

publication of two pastoral letters from the Episcopal Conference of Benin. From 1990, Togo entered the period of the great demands of the people for political change. From this period to this day, the Episcopal Conference has written 13 pastoral letters, three of which are especially in times of political crisis (Ibid). Moreover, these pastoral letters from the Bishops are reflections which accompany citizens and the faithful on the path to democratization. They are not only visible signs of the Church's interference in the political life of these countries, but also the expression of her thought in her relations with politics and States (Kodjo Agayi, 2007: 15). In addition to the abundance of pastoral letters, we also observe the resurgence of "Unidentified Political Objects UIPO" (Martin, 2002) manifested by memoranda, particularly in Cameroon (Assana, 2014 and 2020). Between 1988 and 1992, we can count no less than four collective reactions from the bishops of Cameroon to which, we must add the individual speeches by interview or message to the faithful. (Kougoum, 2009: 451; Eboussi Boulaga, 1997, p.393). At the end of article 156 of the constitution of the Cameroonian Presbyterian Church (CPC):

Any court considering itself the victim of prejudice through the action of another court of the same rank submits a memorandum to the court immediately superior to the one challenged over which it exercises its authority, in accordance with the provisions of subchapter on petitions (Chapter XII, Articles 117-124 of this Book of Discipline), provided that a copy of the memorandum is sent to the secretary of the hierarchical court within one year from the day on which the offended court receives notification of the alleged offense(constitution *of the Cameroonian Presbyterian Church*, Form of government / Book of discipline, January 2019: 107).

In the light of the foregoing, the memoranda participate in the modes of questioning and political expression consecrated in ecclesial organizations. This is the place to specify that it is not an open protest against the Church coming from external groups, but an instrument of protest, of constitutionalized internal protest coming from members considering themselves well as belonging to this group, but who were disappointed. It is therefore positioned well, not as an external critic, but as a desire to change the religious institution (Jonveaux, 2016; Assana, 2021). One hypothesis is currently the subject of considerable debate: that of a profound modification of the contemporary repertoire of action under the effect of globalisation, or if one prefers an increasing internationalisation of mobilisations (Sommier, 2003). Collective action is less and less situated at the level of a state territory and more and more in the transnational space, as shown by the massive use of memoranda on the internationalscene. These memoranda open up the possibility of extending the scope of political action on a national or even international scale. For example, in 1987, 51 out of 80 indigenous priests in the Archdiocese of Douala sent a memorandum to the Vatican on a question of power within the Catholic Church in Cameroon, with a view to shedding new light on the "appointment of two auxiliary bishops alongside Bishop Simon Victor Tonye, 'Bassa', and Bishop Gabriel Simo,'Bamileke', who were potentially called to succeed Bishop Tonye Bakot as Archbishop of Douala[15](Assana, 2020). As can be seen, the protest has penetrated the French-speaking sub- Saharan religious

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[15] They made it a matter of national politics, inviting other Cameroonians to join them in the struggle against the 'dominant tribes' in the country, and in particular against the hegemony of the Bamilekes (Bayart, 1989; C3, 1992;Kougoum, 2009 (cited in Assana, 2020).

organizations. In the understanding of the faithful, democracy refers first of all to a regime of freedom, in particular the possibility of being able to express oneself withoutconstraint, and to peace, to the end of the violence of political arbitrariness (Banégas, pp381- 482).

The other facet of this form of participatory democracy lies in the development of digital technologies (ICTs and social networks). These new technologies are helping to profoundly transform the democratic landscape. They are seen as a means of reorganizing the ethnic balance of power in church organizations (Assana, 2021). Allowing a large number of people to be contacted in record time, the Internet has emerged as a formidable instrument of this participatory democracy (Rifkin, 2000). In this momentum, Susan George recognized that without these new technologies: "we would never have succeeded in bringing together the forces of social struggles from around the world as we are doing now. There are a number of young people who seem to consider themselves citizens of the world" (Susan, 2001 cited by Montes, 2001: 775). The attractive side of this form of participatory democracy stems, as Joseph S. Nye pointed out, from the democratic deficit that accompanies globalization (Nye, 2001 cited by Montes, 2001: 775). There are also areas of concubinage between states and ecclesial organizations in terms of the formation of public space (Habermas, 1987). By relating the invention of new political configurations and religious innovation, Jean-François Bayart already put forward the hypothesis that "the space of worship shapes the future African civic space" (Bayart, 1995: 14). Democratic deliberation in ecclesial organizations thus corresponds to a discursive, egalitarian and contradictory exchange, observed during the synod. As in Western liberal societies, the democratic functioning of church organizations is based on legal equality, the rotation of positions of authority, respect for election procedures, deliberations, political pluralism, and the protection of the rights of minorities. But, unlike the ecclesial organizations, there is a contrary reaction in the Islamic organizations.

The rejection of the single model of democracy
The processes of importing/exporting liberal democracy from model countries to sub- Saharan religious organizations are far from being univocal: on the one hand, because the import is not always desired (colonization, conditional economic aid), and on the other hand, because it implies relations of dependence (political, economic, cultural) (Darbon, 1993: 8). Inany case, the reactions provoked by the import/export of liberal democracy cover a whole range of possibilities[16]: *voice protest* and exit, according to the typology constructed by A. O. Hirschman, 1995 (quoted by Sindjoun, 2001). This author considers defection as a possible behaviour. In this case, it is the radical refusal of liberal democracy as a legitimate mode of political organization (Hirschman, 1995: 40-52 cited by Sindjoun, 2021: 114). Protest or speaking out as a model of behaviour vis-à-vis the democratic norm is a modality of participation in international life (Sindjoun, 2001). It is interesting to note in this regard that these are generally Islamic organizations and states. On analysis, two arguments justify Islamic

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[16] The Arab Charter of Human Rights adopted in 1994, by highlighting the particularism of Islamic civilization, and referring in its preamble to the eternal principles defined by Muslim law", deliberately breaks with the universalist aim of the Declaration of 1948. The two drafts of the Islamic Declaration of Human Rights and the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights go even further since they base human rights on a divine will and encompass the rights set out in the limit of the prescriptions of religious law (Lockak, 2002: 54-55).

protest against the Western model of democracy: anti-Western postures (1) on the one hand, and the Islamic prescription of the model of democracy on the other (2).

The anti-Western postures

The globalization of democracy and human rights is hardly self-evident, particularly inan Africa marked by the seal of singularity (Bettati, 1998; Mbembe, 1992 cited by Donfack Sokeng, 2007: 103; Lochak, 2002: 55). Indeed, democracy and human rights are sometimes denounced, from a Third World and Islamic perspective, as 'an invention of the West, reflecting,even in their claim to be universal, Western ethnocentrism, (...) as a form of neo-colonialism'[17],or even a desire for 'the Westernization of the political order' (Badie, 1992). It is therefore at another level, that of the imaginary, that the global spread of democracy must be considered. Moreover, a controversy divides Western intellectuals and sometimes researchers who take a stand in the debate. Some refer to democracy as part of the culture and history of the West (Jaffrelot, 2000: 5-57; Lochak, 2002: 55), and to Islam as a religion frozen in its timelessness and by nature incompatible with political modernity (Barreau, 1991, p.53 quoted by Nouchine Vavari D'Hellencourt, 1999: 2). If we look closely, the positioning of democracy as a trademarkof the West, as a product of its culture, fuels the issue of identity and difference in international relations (Jaffrelot, 2000). This is the case of certain conservative regimes in Southeast Asia and of the Islamist movement. The former speak of 'Asian values' and the latter of 'Islamic democracy' (Zaiki, 2001: 609). Moreover, the tutelary figure of the United States is so strong that opposition to democratization is seen as a form of anti-Americanism (Sindjoun, 2007: 31). In other words, the weight of suspicion is stronger in the global spread of democracy, given that the related discourse is carried by state actors and Western powers (Bjorkdahl, 2004 quoted by Sindjoun, 2007: 24). There is a strategic confusion between democratization and the Westernization of the world; democratization is presented as a form of Western expansion in a context where the colonial memory is vivid.

The global spread of liberal democracy can also be explained on the side of model exporters by the cross-fertilization of dependency theories and strategic analyses (Reno, 2018:7). This is the place to point out that from the 1970s, the contexts of the Yom Kippur War, the oil shock and the great sub-Saharan droughts combined to strengthen relations between Black Africa and the Arab-Persian world (Triaud, 2007 cited by Mayke and Maud, 2011: 3). The revolution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1979), for its part, gave "this new form of political Islam international visibility and aroused a certain fascination in Muslim circles (Triaud, 2007:10 cited by Mayke and Maud, 2011: 3). This opening up of Arab countries to black Africa (Loimeier, 2005; Bunza, 2005; Miran 2006; Kaag, 2007 cited by Mayke and Maud, 2011: 3) ispart of the expansion and spread of the focus of jihad[18]. Thus, we are witnessing in Africa southof the Sahara the expansion

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[17] The Arab Charter on Human Rights adopted in 1994, by emphasizing the particularity of the Islamic civilization, and by referring in its preamble to the "eternal principles defined by Islamic law", deliberately breaks with the universalist aim of the 1948 Declaration. Both the draft Islamic Declaration of Human Rights and the draft Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights go even further by basing human rights on a divine will and by confining the stated rights to the prescriptions of religious law (Lockak, 2002: 54-55).

[18] In the 1980s, there was a leap from "national Islamism" to "internationalist Islamism". This internationalisation of Jihad was encouraged by the political configuration of the 1980s, characterised by the confrontation of the United States with Iran and the decomposition of Soviet power (see Gomez Garcia, 2011: 24-25).

of a real "religious space" (Holder, 2009 cited by Mayke and Maud,2011: 3) where strategies of proselytism are developed, certainly but also action plans to improve living together. The contemporary expansion of Islam south of the Sahara is frequentlyperceived as the result of the politico-religious activism of Arab states, or even Iran or Pakistan (Otayek, 2003: 53). Democratization sharpens the dynamism of Muslim "transnational entrepreneurs" who take advantage of it to invest in humanitarian activities by connecting to transnational networks and thus benefiting from easier access to Islamic sources of financing [19](Otayek, 2003: 60).

Moreover, God and religion are still present in the constitutions of many States parties to the European Convention, sometimes in the preamble. According to Article 9 of the Constitution of Monaco ("The Catholic, Apostolic and Roman religion is the State religion"); Article 18, paragraph 1, of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, which enshrines the separation by recognising a special role for "the Holy Apostolic Armenian Church as the national church"; Article 11, paragraph 3, of the Constitution of Andorra on the guarantees granted to the Catholic Church. The Constitution of Norway of 17 May 1814, art. 2, 3, 9, 16 (the Evangelical Lutheran Church remains the Norwegian State Church and is "supported as such"); the Constitution of Denmark of 5 June 1953, art. 4 and 6; art. 13 para. 3 of the Constitution of Bulgaria ("The traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria is the Orthodoxfaith"); the Constitution of Malta of 21 September 1964, art. 2 (Gonzalez, 2020). Like some European states, all countries with a majority Muslim population refer to Islam in their constitutions, with Sharia law constituting a source of law for some of them: Saudi Arabia (art.11 of the Basic Law of 1991); Egypt (art.2), Qatar (art.1 Constitution of 29 April 2003) (Amir- Arjomand, 2012: 171-184 quoted by Gonzalez, 2020). These examples are well known and theinfluence of Islam can be seen in the organisations that bring these states together and in the texts they are trying to develop to compete with international texts for the protection of human rights that are too marked, in their view, by the Judeo-Christian and Western identity[20]. Religious institutions play a crucial role

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[19] "Although they are inspired by the organizational and working methods of Western NGOs to the point of being comparable to them in terms of professionalization, Islamic relief organizations differ, however, in that they take advantage of an authentically Muslim conception of charitable action, set up as an alternative model to Western-Christian humanitarianism (Bellion-Jourdan, 2001: 174, quoted by Otayek, 2003: 59). As the bearers of specific norms and values, they participate in a process of communalization of the religious bond, that is, the crystallization of a subjective feeling of belonging to the same community, which tends to weaken national allegiances in favour of a supranational allegiance, pan-Islamic in this case. These identity recompositions are all the more problematic for sub-Saharan states as they also bring to the fore a new category of African Muslim intellectuals, *the Arabisants* (*Ibid*).

[20] For example, the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights adopted on 19 September 1981, the Arab Charter on Human Rights of 15 September 1994 revised on 23 May 2014. As Mustapha Afroukh writes, "the scopeof application of these texts is defined on the basis of a criterion of religious belonging, namely, membership of the Islamic *Umma.* It is less the Man who is targeted than the Muslim ("Rapport introductif", in M. Afroukh (ed.),L'islam en droit international des droits de l'homme, Bayonne, Institut Universitaire Varenne, 2019, p.18. See also,for a more optimistic but questionable view of human rights, (pp.219-233). Some of these minority States are parties to the major international human rights instruments such as the International Covenant on

in the functioning of contemporary States. In the caseof Senegal, for example, focus has been on Islam as a popular political 'counter-culture' (Coulon, 1993; Seck, 2010 cited by Mayke and Maud, 2011: 3), or, on the contrary, Islam constitutes a means in the hands of political and religious elites to maintain and strengthen theirpower (Gueye and Seck, 2011 cited by Mayke and Maud, 2011: 3). From then on, the global spread of democracy in Islamic organizations and states, then directly produces its opposite, i.e,the fragmentation of the same (hence the barbarism of "fragmentation" (Rosenau, 1996). This mechanism operates through the play of identity claims: Muslims believe they can protect themselves from the Westernization of the world, by developing their own approaches to democracy, inspired and legitimized by the Qur'an and the Hadiths, even if it means adopting acritical posture towards the state and the international community (Mayke and Maud, 2011: 2).

The Islamic prescription of the model of democracy

In most of the texts of contemporary Islamist corpus, two verses are presented as proof that Islam prescribes its democratic model and that Muslims do not need to adopt Western liberal democracy to manage their political life (Raboudi, 2008: 38). It is interesting to analyze these two verses to characterize the Islamic model of democracy: The verse of Sura Al-Imran (the family of Imran) is formulated as follows:

You have been kind to them through a mercy of God. If you had been rough and hard-hearted, they would have separated from you. Forgive them! Ask forgiveness for them, consult them on all things; but when you have made a decision, place your trust in God. God loves those who trust in him (Ibid).

In Surah Al-shura (the consultation), we read:

What is with God is better and more lasting for those who believe; those who confide in their lord; those who avoid the most serious sins and turpitudes, those who forgive after being angry; those who answer to their lord; those who perform prayer; those who deliberate among themselves about their affairs; those who give in alms part of the goods that we have granted them (Sura 42 "The deliberation", verse 20, t.1, 84).

Based on the above, shura, that is, consultation or deliberation is the foundation of Islamic democracy. Islamic democracy differs from Western democracy which is liberal[21]. One can then understand Fareed Zakaria's (2003) discourse on "illiberal" democracies which would be primarily democracies more or less ignorant of human rights and the rule of law (cited by Goujon, 2015: 34). Unlike Western democracies, shura or Islamic democracy only allows wise and enlightened members of the community to take part in political decisions. It prevents ill-intentioned, ignorant or inexperienced people from taking responsibility for the management of

Civil and Political Rights, but have made reservations establishing the supremacy of Muslim law: Bahrain, Mauritania, Qatar, Maldives cited by Gérard Gonzalez, 2020).

[21] The preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights states that the maintenance of fundamental freedoms "rests essentially on a democratic system". In the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the state's meeting in 1990 in Copenhagen recognized that "pluralist democracy andthe rule of law are essential to ensure respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms" (Lochak, 2002: 73-74).

public life. He defends the superiority of the spirit of the democratic model of the Islamic shura thus: "The political democracy of the Muslim community is a democracy of life and not a democracy of statistics and comparisons. Wisdom is in the hands of the ulemas (theologians). The Qur'an says "ask the scholars for advice if you are ignorant (Sura 16" the bees ", verse 43). Virtue is rare. Shura creates strength because it adds the wisdom of the counsellor to the wisdom of the counsellors. It is not a quarrel or a controversy between members of society" (Abbas Mahmoud cited by Noomane Raboudi, 2008: 39). In Islamic organizations, political innovation is based on the rejection of the Western model of democracy. Continuity and political innovation are at the service of the conservation of power (Reno, 2018: 11). It is significant to specify that the interpretation of these verses is often accompanied by an ideological outbidding which praises the merit and the avant-garde of the Moslem thought in matter of political theorization and which denigrates the rational and positivist philosophy which bases the liberal democracy (op.cit: 31). Mohammed Al-Ghazali, one of the pillars of Egyptian Islamism in the mid-twentieth century, wrote in his book Our beginning in Wisdom: "in the political sphere.

From the perspective of international relations, Islamic democracy allows Muslims to mobilize the register of the inside/outside distinction and to try to isolate the inside from the outside: democratization as an "imported model" and therefore illegitimate; through the political-ideological construction of the autonomy of the inside, Islamic organizations inscribe the strategy of closure, of the filter in the context of interdependence. The Western demand for democratization is then reinterpreted as participating in a historical contempt, in the will to power of the West (Sindjoun, 2001: 48). It should also be pointed out that after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, a wave of democratization and political openness swept across the world. Only the Arab world and a large part of the Muslim world remained outside this movement of general and profound change[22]. This observation allows us to wonder about a possible exception in the Arab world, which has remained outside the various waves of democratisation (Raboudi, 2008: 41). Consequently, the political construction of a 'clash of civilizations' on the terrain of democracy affects the homogeneity of international society and makes it possible to protest against 'Western hegemony' (Huntington, 2000: 94-103). However, the spread of democracy in states as well as in religious organizations is not a simple reproduction of the Western model. Both in its structures and in its functioning, the model implemented is the result of a hybridization.

The hybridization of the political system of sub-Saharan religious organizations
This section aims to address the implications of the global spread of liberal democracy on the political system of sub-Saharan religious organizations. The question is then that of the degree of convergence or divergence of the model of organization of religious institutions with the Western model of democracy. Indeed, we can apply to the question of the effects of institutional import/export in religious organizations, Denis-Constant Martin's analysis of identities qualified as `` synthetic products, results of a strategic syncretism (Martin, 1992: 585). According to the State of Democracy in the World in 2019, in the majority of cases, hybridity is not the voice of democracy, but a feature: 14). On observations, the hybridization of the

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[22] This observation was made by the team of Arab intellectuals who produced *the Arab Human Development Report, UN*, 2004 (quoted by Raboudi, 2008: 41).

political system of sub-saharan francophone religious organizations is manifested. **The contrasting effects of the worldwide spread of liberal democracy on religious organizations** (A) on the one hand, and the significance of the particularities of the political system (B) of religious organizations on the other.

The contrasting effects of the worldwide spread of liberal democracy on religious organizations

This is because the spread of democracy has hardly produced uniform effects on sub- Saharan religious organizations. Indeed, the effects of this democratic mimicry must beunderstood in both religious organizations and states through the prism of interactions between universality and local specificities. The globalization of democracy is accompanied by originalprocesses of reinterpretation. While in ecclesial organizations the reinterpretation of the Western model of democracy predominates (1), the duel of democratic universalism versus local specificities can be observed in Islamic organizations (2).

The reinterpretation of the Western model of democracy grafted into church organizations

The idea of reception of the Western model of democracy by the sub-Saharan ecclesial organizations must be exempt from any passive connotation, having being understood that, the religious organizations do not only undergo the political model come from elsewhere. From the hypothesis of "reiterative universalism" or of "contiguity" (Walzer, 1992: 114-132), that is to say a universalism in interaction with cultural particularisms, we can understand the local trajectory democratization in church organizations.The spread of democracy is presented as a universal phenomenon that should be contextualized and put into perspective. Therefore, "the diffusion of democracy is not the simple effect of transferring Western instruments into bare societies" (Reno, 2018: 4). Importing democracy then no longer makes sense in itself. It must be analysed through the "encoding" and "reinterpretation" processes which translate its insertion into local political practices (Meny, 1993: 115). What is more, they also make it possible to assess the differences between the ideal type developed from the democratic experience in the West and the different modes of operation; given that the model does not always conform to reality (Quantin, 2009: 65-76). This local reinterpretation of the content of democracy is manifested by the electoral consolidation of ethnic cleavages and the reactivation of local cultures, partially destroyed by colonization. The importation of democracy into sub-Saharan religious organisations is followed by local processes of reappropriation, of reinterpretation that blur the Western reference (Sindjoun, 2000). This local reinterpretation of the content of democracy manifests itself in the electoral consolidation of ethnic cleavages and the reactivation of local cultures, partially destroyed by colonisation.

With regard to the electoral consolidation of ethnic cleavages, in particular in church organizations, it can be analysed as the consequence of democratic mimicry. Indeed, the Protestant or Evangelical Churches have made majority voting their preferred mode of decision-making. In this regard, the reference to majority democracy is very explicit in most of the constitutions of the churches in sub-Saharan Africa. This is particularly the case with the constitution of the Evangelical Church of Cameroon, abbreviated EEC in its article 14, of the

Evangelical Lutheran Mission in Mali in its article 9. Similar references can be found in the constitution of the Evangelical Church of Congo of January 2011 in its article 64 and 47 paragraph 3, the Church of the Christian and Missionary Alliance of Gabon (EACMG) in its article 35 etc. As in the States, the translation of democratic culture in ecclesial organizations seems trapped in the balance of power, the logic of power and ethnic domination. In Ghana, the constitution of the first assemblies in Ashanti country and the recruitment of local agents immediately placed the Ashanti in the leadership of the Church of Pentecost (Sandra, 2003); in Burkina Faso, apart from the interlude of two Ghanaian national officials (1989-19956) after the death of Pastor P. Yanogo and until the election of the current national leader, also of Mossi origin, then we can say that the Church of Pentecost remained in the hands of the Mossi pastors (majority ethnic group) and worship exclusively in Moorea (Sandra, 2003: 867). In Ivory Coast, we are witnessing xenophobic liturgies against a background of denunciation of the omnipresence of Ghanaian leaders in Ivorian assemblies (Ibid). As can be seen, the political behavior of churches is a reflection of their respective ethno-regional base (Mohaman, 2017/2018: 239). This ethno-regional base is the product of a long history, which has seen the construction of religious spaces and ecclesiastical territories (Maud, 2005: 93-116).

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we can observe that democracy in ecclesial organizations is a majority democracy which is based on a majority ethnic group, this duality being expressed in the articulation between a competitive system and the promotion of the ethnic group. Majority like the Israeli model (Smooha, 1989; Dieckhoff, 2008 cited by Goujon, 2015: 154). In sub-Saharan church organizations, democracy has integrated intra-ethnic democracy[23]and an inter-ethnic ethnocracy, unlike the "electoral and democratic quantophrenia" corresponding to the Anglo-Saxon maxim "one man, one vote" (Abouna, 2011: 9). On closer examination, the democratic model practiced in most church organizations is therefore rightly that of a janus state, which borrows both from the lifestyles inherited from ancestors and from the modern nation state (Abouna , 2011: 9-11). The articulation of the relationship between ethnicity and religious order is reinforced by neo-patrimonial practices[24]. More than coercion, cooptation constitutes the means of maintaining what Linda Beck calls "patrimonial democracy or clientelist democracy" (Beck, 2008 cited by Goujon, 2015: 168) in church organizations. Moreover, the imposition of the election as a mode of access to power has not completely pacified the French-speaking sub-Saharan church organizations due to the permanent contestation of the rules of the political game, the results of the elections in various church organizations. This is a given of analyzes and observations at the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Cameroon (EELC) and the Evangelical Church of Cameroon (EEC). At the 1977 elective general synod in Beka-Guiwang, because of a presidential election, this Evangelical Lutheran Church of Cameroon (EELC) came close to schism (Assana, 2021). Likewise, the

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[23] The notion of ethnic democracy could be used to characterize this state in which one ethnic group prevails over others through collective rights while granting individual rights to all citizens.
[24]The neo-patrimonial regime can be defined as the absence of any differentiation between the field of politics and other aspects of society such as the kinship system (Weber 1968 cited by Fauré, Médard, 1982). Neopatrimonialism and patronage are significant practices in the religious field. We observe a strong prevalence of neo-patrimonialist practices in the ecclesial administration with the appointment of relatives of political leaders to positions in the high ecclesial office.

tensions of 1999-2000 which shook the communities of Bethel in Ngaoundéré (Cameroon) following an assignment of pastors was interpreted as a punitive assignment against a background of ethnic discrimination in this ecclesial organization. These conflicts that explode in the electoral situation sometimes lead to physical violence (Assana, 2021). To this, we can add, the vibrant protests of Lay Bamoun committed to the Evangelical Church of Cameroon (EEC) and, that of the Pastoral, held from June 20 to 22, 2017 in Bwadibo constitute clear and clear positions in favor of of the vehement refusal of the Sawa and the Bamoun to comply with the verdict of the ballot box (Cf the Declaration of the Laity Bamoun engaged of the Evangelical Church of Cameroon published on June 12, 2017) quoted by Assana, 2021). Ethnic conflicts and violence in religious denominations reveal weaknesses in the management of elections and in the rules for healthy political competition.

As in the States, the democratic transition indeed favours ethnic outbidding during electoral competitions in ecclesial organizations[25]. This has been analysed and observed in the Église Évangélique du Cameroun (EEC) (Assana, 2021;Abouna, 2011). Proof if it were needed of the significance of the contextual variable, the universalist ideology of democracy has not withstood ethnicity. In ecclesial organizations, socio-ethnic conflicts are a grid for understanding the challenges of transferring democratic mechanisms. In addition to the electoral consolidation of ethnic cleavages, the irruption of cultures, understood here as "codes of enunciation of religious, ethnic or national particularisms" (Otayek, 2003: 63), on the international scene is often perceived as another factor that relativizes democratic universalism.[26].

where he is embodied in the Churches (Otayek, op.cit.). In the Congo, we must observe with Joseph Tonda another phenomenon, illustrated by the recovery of ancestral rites of deliverance or exorcism operated during the Sovereign National Conference of February 1991 by Bishop Kombo, who presided over and invented a "great syncretic mass. »Magico-religious birth of democracy. In Cameroon, the Bamileke clergy speak out in favor of polygamy, a secular cultural practice in force in this group" (Abouna, 2011: 31). In reality, the problem of the electoral consolidation of ethnic cleavages and the reactivation of local cultures in ecclesial organizations paradoxically illustrates the contradictions of the identity politics of a Church which sees itself as both indigenous and international (Sandra, 2003: 860) . In ecclesial organizations as in States, there has been the invention of political modernity by "invention of tradition" (Hobsbawn, 1983 cited by Bayart, 2009: 27-44). Consequently, mimicry is thus differentiated from "duplication in that it supposes not a pure and simple replication of a technology but its importation associated with a reinterpretation.[27]"(Darbon, 1994: 121). The

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[25] The democratic "procedure" itself can be dangerous and lead to conflict (We refer readers to Snyder and Mansfield E. Mansfield, Jack Snyder, 1995).

[26]"Diffusion therefore results from a more complex process than the simple transfer of external instruments. Endogenous logics strongly condition its success or failure. In this regard, it is necessary to take into account the achievements of the historical sociology of politics, which favor explanatory variables of a historical and cultural nature and help to shed light on the blind spots of the sociology of diffusion" (Reno, 2018: 7).

[27] The recent change in vocabulary expressed, for example, by the gradual disappearance of the political science vocabulary of the notion of mimicry or at least its relegation to so-called `` peripheral '' geographical areas and political regimes in favor of more current and more " noble " import / export, expresses this tendency and illustrates

shift towards the global does not mean the erasure of the national and local framework. It is both a contagious democratic effect in church organizations and a duel between liberal democracy and Islamic democracy in religious organizations.

The duel between democratic universality against specificity in Islamic organizations
Unlike church organizations, the duel of democratic universalism versus specificity defines the local trajectory of democratization in sub-Saharan Islamic organizations.[28]. Recourse to cultural relativism (Cliford, 1998; Appadurai, 1990: 6-7; Bayart, 1994: 9-43; Rouland, 1998 cited by Donfack Sokeng, 2007: 105) cannot therefore be ruled out, subject to the nuances and criticisms customary when it comes to considering the implementation of democracy and human rights across Africa. This duel results in Islamism, understood as the political use of Islam mobilized in reaction to the "Westernisation" considered as aggressive with regard to national and religious identity, reaction perceived as an anti-modern protest (Etienne, 2003: 46 cited by Mandjem, 2020: 41). In addition to this questioning of the outside, a challenge from the inside is articulated, which takes the form of a radicalization of certain actors and discourses. Among these actors are the Arabists, whom the knowledge acquired in the medersa and the Arab-Islamic universities leads to think as a counter-elite to compete with the leadership of the Westernized elites in power. These groups are in the minority but their influence is growing in countries such as Mali, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Kenya or Nigeria where Sharia law has been imposed in twelve northern states, raising serious questions about the secularism of the Nigerian state (Otayek, op.cit, p.62). At the turn of the millennium, anthropological approaches linking religion and public life (Sounaye, 2007) became increasingly common. They highlight strong societal commitments (Kaag, 2011 cited by Mayke and Maud, 2011: 3), forms of Islamic citizenship involving religious activists in city life (Gomez-Perez and Leblanc, 2007 cited by Mayke and Maud, 2011: 3). Social cadets, young people and women, are accessing new modes of public expression (Masquelier, 2009; Soares, 2009 cited by Mayke and Maud, 2011: 3). Very significantly, it is the issue of secularism that polarises the criticism of sub-Saharan political Islam activists: whether in Senegal, where the Family Code is denounced as too westernised (Otayek, *op.cit.*, p.62), Kenya with regard to the Code of Succession, Mali and Niger, where the stigmatisation of the West focuses on the political expression of its hegemony, the Jacobin and secular nation-state (Otayek, *op.cit.*, p.62). This is the case, for example, of the Arabists in Burkina Faso who have reread the Sankarist revolution (1983-1987) in the light of 'Quranic socialism' in order to destabilise the geroncratic frameworks of Burkina Faso's Islam (Otayek, 1993: 101-127 cited by Otayek, *op.cit,* p.65). Moreover, Islamism has participated in the complex movement of construction of the jihadist identity. It would then have forged a "substitute community" for those humiliated and disappointed by Western civilization (Mandjem, 2020).

One could, drawing on Paul Mandjem's analysis, assert that jihadjist groups are entities pursuing a composite ideological objective: it is a question of launching global jihad and of

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the extremely shifted scientific treatment that African countries and European countries receive (…) (Darbon, 1994: 123).

[28] "Democratization is not understood here as an obligatory trajectory, even if it may be desired, nor even as an infallible process, but rather as a means of questioning the borders of democracy" (Goujon, 2015: 9).

applying Sharia law on the conquered territory which would thus become the basis of an Islamic state (Duby, 2013, p.37 cited by Mandjem, 2020: 5). They assert their international dimension, constitute a stronghold of recruitment which transcends national borders and expresses their hostility to the influence and the expansion of the West or of Western modernity in the world. Today with the overflow of neighbouring states, he plans to establish a Caliphate without borders (Baud, 2009, P.62 cited by Mandjem, 2020: 6.), except those imposed by the limits of his territorial conquests. Indeed, the historicity of the expansion of jihadjist ideology in relation to the Boko Haram group in the Lake Chad Basin cannot ignore the importance of the State of Nigeria as the main source of diffusion of political Islamism in the region (Mandjem, 2020: 9). Historically, this country has been seen as a land of choice and development of Islamisms (Triaud and Kane, 1998 cited by Mandjem, 2020: 9).

In addition, the violent repression of Islamists, supported to varying degrees by Western democracies, discredits democratic currents and solidifies Muslim populations with Islamist currents (Noomane Raboudi, 2008: 42). In post 9/11 international relations, the armed imposition of particularly democratic values is at the heart of the discourse of justification of the foreign policy of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan and within the framework of the "greater Middle East" (Sindjoun, 2007). Behind the worldwide diffusion of democracy, there would be the idea of a manoeuvre by the West to impose its political models in international relations. As we can see, the institutional import-export indeed presents a particular acuity in the relations, conflictual and cooperative at the same time, which settled between Western countries and Third World countries, countries with a colonial tradition and colonized countries (Meny, 1994: 7). From another angle, even if religious political systems share elements with other political systems, the fact remains that the religious essence constitutes a differentiating factor.

The particularities of the political system of religious organizations
To understand the socio-political functioning of religious organizations, it is important to take an interest in their political system. Religious organizations are both "an abstract theological reality" and a "material social reality" (the local, regional, national Christian assembly "(Koulagna, 2016: 152). They are above all an organization whose essence is of divine origin. They organize and regulate their activities by combining the Holy Scriptures, the liturgy, the Constitution, the Internal Regulations, the Sharia and texts. The laws which govern the political-institutional system of religious organizations are not only human or democratic laws, but related to divine and theocratic laws[29]. The only legitimatesource of political power is not the sovereignty of the people. However, the political systems of ecclesiastical organizations (1) and Islamic organizations (2) appear in their singularity, hence the interest of the concept of historical trajectory as proposed by Barrington Moore (1969). It is a question of revealing the specific circumstances that determine the particular configuration of a political system.

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[29] Theocracy is a political system based on respect for a religious doctrine, whether Judaic, Christian, Muslim, or otherwise.

The essence of the ecclesial political system

Ecclesial organizations in sub-Saharan Africa are strongly marked by the specificity of their political system which is based on three main models: First, the Catholic episcopal model according to which: In the Roman Catholic Church:

this system operates under the sovereignty of the Pope, who is considered to be the personal successor of Peter, the Prince of the Apostles and the Vicar of Christ". Surrounded by the college of bishops, but also independently of them, he exercises a primacy in the Church and is endowed with charisma, infallibility when he expresses himself as Head of the Church and promulgates the dogmas ex-cathedra. (Tomren, 2014: 68-69).

On the political level, the Catholic Church is organized according to a very centralized and pyramidal model.[30]. In each country in the world where the Catholic Church is present, the archbishops and bishops have under their responsibility a clergy of priests who will be in contact with the faithful. This historic line is seen as a necessity for the political authenticity of the Churches. This is the system that prevails in the Roman Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, the Episcopal Churches (and some Lutheran Churches). Nevertheless, the affirmation of the centralized and pyramidal model in the Catholic Church is concomitant with the imposition of religious decentralization from below which results in the establishment of small Christian communities at the level of neighbourhoods and villages. They allow the local Church to transfer to the laity the burden of the daily expression of the faith as well as that of its dissemination; henceforth it is up to them to ensure the proclamation of the Word, to do catechesis, to animate prayers, to visit the sick, to ensure a kind of "liturgical self-management". Tracing the evolution of this phenomenon in Africa, Florence Boillot affirms that:

The movement began in Zaire, where in 1970 the diocese of Kinshasa proposed, as part of its fundamental options, to set up grassroots communities. It was followed in 1973 by Cameroon, then by the Central African Republic, Congo, Chad, Angola and Mozambique. In West Africa, it is Upper Volta which plays a pioneering role, this country will then be joined by The Gambia and Senegal. Finally, in East Africa, it is all the churches of AMECA (Association of Episcopal Conferences of East Africa) which opted for the establishment of "small" Christian communities "in 1976. For all these Churches, the establishment of CCB is a true Copernican revolution. It reflects first of all the adoption of a new ecclesiology which contributes to shifting the center of gravity of the Catholic hierarchical pyramid a little more towards the base, and to insert the Church in the places of very existence of the populations. It then materializes a new pastoral care centered on the laity, the latter ceasing to be the passive consumer of the religious message to become a pastoral actor of the CCBs also becomes the keystone of African theological construction. (Boillot, 1997: 121).

The establishment of small basic Christian communities (CCB) contributes to the promotion of the decentralization of ecclesial governance for the benefit of the laity in the Catholic Church. However, the centralized organization of the Catholic Church contrasts with the flexibility of the Evangelical Churches.

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[30]At the level of the Roman Curia, the Pope has authority over the Synod of Bishops, the College of Cardinals and the Secretariat of State; it is he who appoints the bishops, cardinals and secretaries. At the national level, it is the episcopal conferences, created for the most part after the Vatican Council II, which allow decisions to be made as to the orientations of the Church in each country, their power remaining however very limited and subject to approval. of the Holy See (Gomes, 2005: 50).

From the point of view of organizational structure, we can distinguish three main types of organization among evangelical churches that coexist with the democratic model. They are structured according to three forms: Presbyterian, Congregationalist or Episcopal. The three types of structure exist as much among the traditional as among the Pentecostals (Gomes, 2005: 66). Then, the congregational system (Presbyterian, reformed) in the Presbyterian churches which:

entrusts authority in the Church and its government to the council of presbyters, made up of the pastor and elders. Finally, the congregationalist system affirms the autonomy of the parish and the participation of all the faithful in its government. The synodal assembly is conceived as a simple consultative body which cannot impose anything on the local Churches, except fidelity. To teaching and To recognized scriptural practice (*Tomren, op.cit*).

 Finally, the Lutheran system which:

Entrust the foundation of the Church to the sacraments (Baptism and Holy Communion) and the Word of God. According to Lutherans, the Church consists of people who are reservoirs of the word of God and of the sacraments. The Church is in principle invisible. Because of this we can qualify the Lutheran model as personal.

All the faithful have, by virtue of the universal priesthood, direct access to God and to Christ, and all have an obligation to serve God. The minister / pastor, or in some countries priest is seen as a practical arrangement to ensure the administration of the sacraments in accordance with the word of God and correct and Bible-conforming preaching. Because of this need, the Church must train and ordain pastors. Apart from this, the Lutheran churches feel free to organize themselves in a multitude of different ways ...*Tomren, op.cit*).

It is a form of governance which associates the laity in the management of ecclesial organizations. It is therefore important to study the essence of the Islamic political system.

The essence of the political system of Islamic organizations
Seeing the Koran as a constitution is the cornerstone of Islamist ideology (Raboudi, 2008). In its doctrine, Islam ignores the principle of secularism, that is to say the distinction between politics and religion. Religious rules are rules that apply in civilian life. They consist mainly of the proclamation of Islam as the state religion and the recognition of the Sharia as the source of state legislation (Gomez Garcia, 2011: 29). The other forms of links between the political and the religious that will become, for some trends in Islam, founding facts, concern the survival of the Caliph: the titles of successors of the Prophet (title of the first Caliph) or commander of the believers (titletaken by the second Caliph) give the political authority the role of a religious authority(Mohamed, 2005). In this regard, it is interesting to mention that the Caliphate as "a form of political and territorial organization without borders is a fiction that producesreality effects" (Mandjem, 2020:17). The law of the faithful and the legislative powerreside in the Qur'an (or law of God) and the Sunna (or tradition of the prophet), with the single ruler, the caliph or imam (religious and temporal ruler), being responsible for the execution of Islamic law or Sharia (composed of the Qur'an and the *Sunna*). Inalmost all the Koranic text, power is linked to wealth, prosperity and demographic abundance (Noomane Raboudi, 2008: 38). In

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trying to subject Muslim societies to a system where the political, the legal and the religious are intertwined, the Islamists are trying to apply a political-legal system that was conceived and designed to organize atribal society into a largely urbanized political society (Raboudi, 2008: 38).

However, it would be excessive to conclude that Islam and democracy are incompatible from a Huntingtonian perspective (Barreau, 1992 cited by Yavari, 1999: 2; Islam is also a historical construction and as such it can legitimize ademocratic system as well as an autocratic regime (Carré, 1992). Muslim communities are extremely diverse ethnically, politically and ideologically, and their attitudes towards Western democracy vary widely (Raboudi 2008: 29). As such, Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa are no less committed to democracy than people of other faiths (Bratton 2003: 493-501). Soroush is a controversial thinker who argues that democratic values and human rights have a place in all Islamic government, and that there can be no definitive and total vision of Islam (thus rejecting any attempt to formulate an official Islamic political ideology) (Gemma 1999: 9). In some states, suchas Mauritania, the affirmation of the supremacy of Islamic law as the 'sole source of law' is coupled with the people's solemn attachment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Donfack Sokeng, 2007: 125). At the same time, in the competition within the Islamic sphere, some actors have the mission of countering the anti-Western discourse of their co-religionists, which they consider counterproductive in terms of development. Within the same faith, readings of religious texts vary and can lead to different visions of advocacy (Kaag and Maud, 2011: 6).

CONCLUSION

At the end of this analysis, it is clear that French-speaking sub-Saharan religiousorganizations have a relationship to democracy identical to that of states. The international circulation of democratic values does not accommodate the structural differentiations and theoretical partitions established between the actors of international relations. The systematic dichotomy between the actors of international relations deserves to be strongly relativized. The global spread of liberal democracy, like the whole process of institutional engineering of which it is only one form, is characterized by its great complexity, if only "because it is situated at the hinge of creative logics apparently exclusive of each other and yet closely intertwined" (Darbon, 1994: 113). Democracy and religion are elements of identity that bring religious organizations closer to states. The religious identity displayed by the state guides the type of relationship it has with the Western model of democracy. Consequently, the legal and institutional frameworks of ecclesial organisations are marked by many similarities with the dominant democratic models in the States. In many respects, common logics of action, shared habitus and areas of concubinage between States and religious organisations can be observed in the interactional dynamics with democracy. The practices and fundamental principles proper to liberaldemocracy (democratic citizenship, consent, representation, popular sovereignty), which are almost exclusively associated with the institutions of the nation-state, are imported into ecclesial organizations. The variable for measuring this homology of rationality is and remains uncertainty. As in the case of states, the democratic transition in ecclesiastical

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organizations favors nationalistic and ethnic overbidding duringelectoral competitions and very often leads to conflicts in multi-ethnic religiousorganizations.

But in French-speaking sub-Saharan religious organizations, the global spread of liberal democracy has mainly served to also reveal the hybrid nature of the political system of religious organizations. As democracy is promoted by the great powers, sub- Saharan religious organizations have channelled their openness to democracy through heterogeneous combinations of their political order that fall under identities described as "products of synthesis", the results of a "strategic syncretism" (Martin, 1992: 585).If we look closely, the religious political order drinks from liberal democracy in its various forms in the states (procedural, representative, majoritarian, constitutional, deliberative, consultative, participatory, electronic, ethnic democracy, etc.). Moreover, French-speaking sub-Saharan religious organisations are home to a plurality of particular trajectories of democratisation. While in the ecclesial organizations with a Judeo-Christian tradition, one observes the reinterpretation of the Western model of democracy, it is quite the opposite in the Islamic organizations where one observes a reaction of rejection and the duel between democratic universality versus local specificity.

Universalism and cultural relativism are the two poles around which the reception of liberal democracy by sub-Saharan religious organizations is articulated. It is significant to note that the rates of expansion of democracy and religion in international relations are uneven. Christian and Muslim religions were initially linkedto Western and Arab cultures respectively, and were above all carried by non-state actors and organizations (missionaries and preachers); paradoxically, because of theirendogenization, they became a factor of local nationalism, and even instrumentsfor preserving local identity in the face of democratic interference. The fetishism of the long term has taken over the naturalization of history in the diffusion of imported religions[31]. The globalization of religion is thus much more advanced than the globalization of democracy, which is equated with the Westernization of the world. From then on, religious organizations think they can protect themselves against the "Westernization of the world" by the Africanization of democracy in ecclesial organizations (Catholics and Protestants) or by mobilizing Islamic (consultative)democracy inspired and legitimized by the Koran and the Hadiths in Islamic organizations. The current vigour of Islamo-nationalism in Islamic sub-Saharan states shows an inflection in the local trajectory of liberal democracy. Clearly, this homology of rationalities between religious organizations and states in the relationship to democracy reveals the fragility of theoretical partitions and structural differentiationsbetween classical (state) and contemporary (non-state) actors in international relations;or at least that the international circulation of democratic values does not accommodate theoretical partitions on actors.

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[31] Islam is fourteen centuries old (See Lewis, 2003: 55). As for Christianity, Paul's epistles reached Africa as early as the 180s, no doubt translated into Latin, and served there as the basis for the first evangelization (Baslez, 2013: 549-576).

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